erXos 0.1, a preview.
0.1 is a development preview for the Raspberry Pi 4 and
for QEMU virt. It is not a release for use.
Every boot prints development build: trusted code only.
Run only code you trust on it, on a network you trust. Nothing in a
development build enforces isolation between its domains, and the
limitations below say what else a user of 0.1 is exposed to.
The downloads, and the build record beside each, name the commit they were built from and the SHA-256 of every file.
What works.
- The kiosk. The screen shows a clock and a panel of live quotes fetched over HTTPS, on QEMU's virtio-gpu and on the Pi's HDMI0 through the firmware's framebuffer.
- SSH to
rc.ssh -p 2222 root@HOSTgives root's command shell, withpsandtop, anderl'serx:domains()lists every domain of the machine. Your key comes fromauthorized_keyson the card'sERXOSvolume, which the first boot copies into/root/.ssh/authorized_keys. - The clock. It starts at the build's date at each
boot, so HTTPS works at once; on the Pi 4
ntpdthen sets it frompool.ntp.org, and root can set it withdate. - Files that survive.
/datais a littlefs volume on the card: a file you synced survives a power cut. Home directories are/rootand/home/NAME. - Recovery. A fault of the system domain resets the board, which boots back to the kiosk. On the Pi 4 the hardware watchdog resets a hang of the kernel or the root within about 4 seconds.
- Doom. The Pi 4 card and the QEMU release medium
carry Doom: type
doominrc; the browser demo does not. On QEMU it takes keys from the virtio keyboard; on the Pi, which has no keyboard in 0.1, it runs its demo loop. It is an example, not part of erXos.
Getting started.
The steps are in the README's Getting started. In short:
- Download the Raspberry Pi 4 card, check its SHA-256, and write it to
a microSD card of at least 4 GB (
xz -dc card.img.xz | sudo dd of=/dev/rdiskN bs=4mon macOS). The Pi's bootloader must be from 2022-12-01 or later. - Copy your public key, an
ssh-ed25519line, to a file namedauthorized_keysin the root of the card'sERXOSvolume. The published images carry no key, so without this file no login works. The first boot copies the keys into root's/root/.ssh/authorized_keys, and from then on SSH reads only that copy. - Put the card in the Pi with an Ethernet cable and a screen on HDMI0,
and power it. The banner and the
%prompt appear on the serial console (115200 baud) within a minute, then the kiosk on the screen. ssh -p 2222 root@HOST, thendateto set the time.
For QEMU, from a clone run make pack PLATFORM=qemu-virt,
then tools/erx boot --medium build/production-image/qemu-virt/medium.img:
QEMU shows the display in its window with the virtio keyboard and tablet,
the serial console is on your terminal, and your port 2222 reaches the
guest's SSH. Add --print for the plain
qemu-system-aarch64 command. The page does not offer the medium for download yet.
Known limitations.
Security. Each item names where the project records it.
- Trusted code only. A development build enforces no isolation between domains (the downsides of Fiasco).
- Any key in
authorized_keysis root. The key opens root'srcover the network. - SSH runs in root's session. OTP's SSH daemon, its transport and authentication included, runs with root's authority, so a flaw in it that is reached before login is root's session. A separate SSH domain comes in 0.2 (stages).
- The login keys are readable in root's session. Root's session holds a read-only grant of the card's keys for its first-boot import, until 0.2's SSH domain removes it (H8).
- Whoever can write the card can become root. Before
the first boot they can add their key to the card's
authorized_keys, and at any time they can write root's home copy on the data partition. - A root login can keep itself. Root's keys are
/root/.ssh/authorized_keys, which root's session can write, so anything running as root, or anyone logged in as root, can add a key that lasts across boots (login keys). - The host key may be weak. When a boot's random seed is only a counter, the SSH host key made at first boot comes from a weak seed (host keys).
- DMA. The evidence of how each board's firmware leaves its DMA-capable devices at handover is not recorded.
Behavior.
- The clock is approximate. It starts at the build's
date at each boot and no network time sets it. Until root runs
date, a certificate that expired after the build is still accepted, and you set the time again after every boot. - SSH is on port 2222, not 22, and gives an
interactive session only: a command given to
sshis refused. - Requested power-off. On the Pi a requested power-off halts the board in the firmware and the watchdog restarts it about 4 seconds later. Only cutting the power turns it off.
- Recovery gaps. A hang before the root's watchdog starts stays hung until the power is cycled, and a kernel panic that early loops instead of resetting.
- Updates are by reflashing the card, which erases
/data. There is no update service and no trial boot. - The Pi has no USB keyboard in 0.1, so Doom there only runs its demo loop, and no WiFi.
- Left to 0.2 and later. The release build without the development banner, a login on the console, untrusted apps, the vault, installing an app at run time (unless it lands first), the desktop and toybox's applets.
Licenses.
erXos's own code is BSD-2-Clause. Every image carries a
NOTICES file with the third-party notices. The Pi 4's device
tree is GPL-2.0, shipped with its source; the Raspberry Pi firmware is
under Broadcom's license. The kernel, a modified Fiasco, is MIT, except
its debugger's object listing, which is GPL-2.0; the debugger is built in
for this preview. The browser demo's notices are in
v64/NOTICES.txt. Imported source trees
in the repository each keep their notices and an ORIGIN.md
with where they came from. Doom is GPL-2.0-or-later and its Freedoom data
BSD-3-Clause; its source is erXos's fork of
doomgeneric at commit 5d58740fb0022a43d6bb9066d535768c220f43aa,
the one the images are built from. Each download links the erXos source
it was built from.